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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
SOURCES METHODS EXEMPTION 3B2B
NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT
DATE 2007

12 October 1961

SUBJECT: AEDEPOT Emergency Assembly

1. A solution to the problem of recalling the AEDEPOT assets from all over the United States, prior to, or in the case of a surprise attack, during open hostilities to a central meeting point has been lacking since the conception of the Project, and in view of increased world tensions more concrete plans must be formulated. The views and proposals set forth herein are not exclusively those of the writer but represent opinions expressed by various members of the DOB staff and are intended more as a think piece than anything else.

2. Plans for several different situations should be considered. It is realized that varying degrees of these situations will probably exist but the conditions for the purposes of this paper, as I see them, can be put into three basic categories:

a. A period wherein we have advance notice or indications of imminent hostilities, but still one where relative calm and order exist throughout the populace. This period could vary from weeks down to, perhaps, a day.

b. A condition wherein the population has been informed of the probability of an attack. Generally confusion would reign, travel will be difficult, if not nigh onto impossible and CONELRAD would provide the only existing reliable means of communication. This period would probably not be longer than several days.

c. A condition of surprise attack.

3. Under condition "a" above, little problem exists. A telephone call, telegram, personal meeting, a letter would suffice.

Under condition "b" above the problem is twofold, namely notification and movement to the assembly area. CONELRAD notification could be accomplished ala BBC i.e., "The Moon is Red" etc. Broadcasts every hour or whatever could be arranged may provide the necessary link here. Transportation presents the most formidable problem. Air transportation will be necessary in most cases and I imagine the military will have control of most of the facilities. Some type of "all powerful" letter or orders in the possession of the agents prior to use does not seem like good procedure, but to supply them "at a later date but before they are needed" will take some real crystal ball work. If something along this line could be worked out and provided now, in some sort of a sealed (by TSD) container, it could provide the entree necessary with the military at the time it is needed. Any document of this sort would require very close control.

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Condition "c" above, from virtually all I've read on the subject, would mean the end of the AEDEPOT Project for which it was originally intended. We would however, still have a roster of good, trained agents that could be used on other missions. The communication and transportation problems existing in the "b" condition would be present in an even greater form.

4. Taking an optimistic viewpoint and assuming we can overcome the obstacles presented by communication and travel, what would constitute a suitable assembly area and can the proper arrangements be made regarding logistical support etc. Other unanswered related questions might be what will be done with the agents if and when they manage to get to the assembly point? Will sufficient staff be available to properly train and dispatch the agents on their respective missions? Aircraft will most certainly be at a premium without which little can be accomplished. It would appear that a lot of earmarking will have to be done if the AEDEPOT project is to be taken seriously.

5. In conclusion I'd like to recommend that thought be directed by all of us to "just where is AEDEPOT going". Comments are invited from all sections regarding what could and should be done that is not presently being done. Where can we improve? Particular emphasis on just what are we going to try to do when the balloons go up. Perhaps most of us are guilty of sitting back and believing that someone else is doing these things. It would be a rude awakening for all concerned when that day comes - and no one has done anything.

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Requirements.

Air Strip - 3000 ft if possible. runway lights preferred.

Aircraft - C-54 for round robin pick-up - not full time req.

C-47 for permanent use. resupply, dropping etc.

L-28 for short trips - parachute work - L-2's etc.

Billets - Permanent type structures most desirable. Sufficient space for 125 to 150 personnel. Messing facilities.

Equipment - Certain equip should be stockpiled now. Other earmarked ~~for~~ assembly point as soon as situation worsens. Arrangements for support on a continuing basis should be made well in advance of actual need.

A detailed list will be submitted at a later date.

Personnel - As far as possible as many "interchangeable" staff types should be assigned. I doubt if we'll be fat enough for the "that's not my job" types. Approx. 35 permanent staff (plus several special TDY people) employees should be able to handle the approx 100 agent types. Air crews when not flying should be assigned appropriate duties. Admin types assist in tiring when needed etc.

Transportation - A railroad nearby would help. The roads leading to + from the assembly area should be paved or

be at least "all weather" roads. Vehicles required would sound something like:

1 5 ton van type truck

1 2½ ton open body

1 1 ton panel truck

2 jeeps

10 Station wagons

~~Facilities~~ Desirable:

Garage - aircraft repair facilities

Separate office space - Secure areas

Lake or river - for maritime work

Boat + flat equipped aircraft - for maritime work

Wooded ~~area~~ and extensive areas - field, demo + smallams

Controllable areas - Security control over roads etc.

Hazardous arrangement -

Possible Federally controlled areas as alternate to isolation

Shenandoah National Park 211,615 Acres - Virginia

Acadia National Park 41,966 Acres - Maine

Great Smoky Mountains National Park 508,480 Acres - N.C.-Tennessee

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25 September 1961

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, War Plans Staff
SUBJECT : Support for Externally-Held Assets
REFERENCE : ORMA-00680 dated 18 July 1961 from []
[] to C/WPS

1. The questions set forth in sub-paragraphs 3.c., d., e., and g. of referenced dispatch from Paris have been examined carefully in SR Division. We have worked in close consultation with the Plans and Operations Staff of the Office of Communications in exploring the background for our answers to the questions raised in sub-paragraphs 3.c. and e.

2. It is proposed that your incorporate in your overall response to SWPS the following answers with respect to separate questions indicated below:

c. Necessary communications and related equipment items will be carried by the individual agents trained under ARREPOT. Such equipment will be drawn from Strategic Stock maintained by the Office of Communications.

d. The individual ARREPOT agents will require operational supplies and equipment items which are appropriate and (as the need therefor is indicated) unique to the area of operation involved and the target mission to be accomplished. Such equipment will include, but will not necessarily be limited to, suitable small arms and ammunition, survival equipment for prolonged black living, explosives and demolitions, clothing, money, documentation appropriate for the area involved, etc. These items will be drawn from stockpiles maintained in the U.S. and will be carried by the individual agents. (Limited quantities of these items have already been stockpiled and additional items can be acquired on relatively short notice.)

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e. While signal plans are not as yet ready for operational use, steps have already been undertaken to initiate preparation by the Office of Communications. These will be maintained in a state of readiness and will be tailored to the support of AMERPOL agent assets in the deployment phase (based on specific JCS requirements materialized geographically by the coordinates reflected in the target listings made available to CIA by the JCS).

f. All agent assets trained through the AMERPOL program have received the basic 16 week training course and the majority have attended one or more advanced training courses which are provided annually, to maintain them in a state of readiness for possible operational employment.

g. It is the writer's understanding received from [] at the time of the receipt of SWPA's original inquiry that the answers to questions raised in sub-paragraphs 3.a., b., and f. will either be developed by your office or remain to be worked out by SWPA in consultation with EUCOM.



SR/COP/Plans

Distribution:

- 1 - Addressee
- 1 - AC/DOB✓
- 1 - WP/Requirements
- 1 - Chrono